assert that "on the average," for example, offenders who murder whites are four times more likely to be sentenced to death than comparable individuals who murder blacks does not conclusively resolve whether the offender in question was discriminated against (even if his/her victim were white).
In this article, therefore, we turn to the second kind of arbitrariness: capriciousness. In the Furman decision, Justice Stewart observed that existing jury sentencing was "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual" (Furman v. Georgia 1972:209).Justice Brennan agreed that the existing procedures were "little more than a lottery system" (p. 293). Justice White found "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many in which it is not" (quoted in Gross & Mauro 1989:6) . Such problems were supposed to have been eliminated by current death penalty statutes, found constitutional under Gregg, which ostensibly constrained and guided the sentencing discretion of prosecutors and capital juries.
It is, therefore, constitutionally important to know whether, in fact, the revised state death penalty statutes are effectively reducing or eliminating capriciousness in capital sentencing. For as Justice White observed in Furman, " 'legislative policy' is . . necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized, but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon them" (Furman 1972:314) . To answer part of this broader question, we address below one important step in the death sentencing process: the prosecutor's decision to charge a offender with a death-eligible homicide. We begin by exploring how the concept of a lottery may be used to inform the justices' concerns about capriciousness. Then, using data from 1978 through 1988 for San Francisco, we illustrate how one might empirically address the question of capriciousness; after briefly examining arbitrariness through discrimination, we consider arbitrariness through capriciousness. Finally, we speculate a bit about the implications of our illustration for the conception of capriciousness.
It is perhaps important to stress that we will take an unorthodox stance. In particular, we are ultimately concerned with how the probabilities of a capital charge are distributed across offenders in a given jurisdiction. For example, one state's criminal justice system might effectively group homicide offenders into two categories. Most fall into a category in which the probability of a capital charge is very small, perhaps 1 in 500. But a few fall into a category in which the probability of a capital charge is rather high, perhaps 1 in 2. In contrast, another state's criminal justice system might effectively group homicide offenders into a large number of categories in which the likelihood of a capital charge clusters tightly around a central tendency of about one capital charge for every 20 homicide cases.
We argue below that it is in the consideration of outcome distributions such as these that capriciousness can be usefully examined. While we make a serious effort to uncover the determinants of capital charges, we do not here build our substantive story on the specific characteristics of offenders, victims, and cases that lead to particular charging distributions; we are far less interested in why certain explanatory variables may prove to be important than in capriciousness per se.
In summary, our article has two primary goals. The first is to raise for consideration how one might constructively think about the role of chance in the processing of homicide cases. The random component is not a statistical approximation of what is really unfolding but is for practical purposes the empirical reality itself. The second is to highlight the distribution of charging outcomes as a critical jurisprudential issue in its own right. Far more is involved than statistical arguments about the amount of "explained variation" or the "goodness of fit."
I. Some Conceptions of Capriciousness
Perhaps the only common theme in the Justices' references to capriciousness has been overwhelming uncertainty. In Furman, it was, in their view, impossible meaningfully to distinguish individuals who were sentenced to death from those who were not. One way to add more conceptual precision to this observation is to take seriously Justice Brennan's allusion to a lottery.
None of the justices believed that death penalty decisions were literally lotteries. That is, there was no conscious effort by criminal justice decisionmakers to produce a stochastic outcome, as one might by flipping a coin, spinning a roulette wheel, or drawing a card from a thoroughly shuffled deck. Rather, the Justices were concerned that the Furman-era statutes inadvertently produced outcomes that looked as if they had been-and may equally well have been, in fact-produced by lottery mechanism. Justice White expressed the Supreme Court's hope that the appearance of a lottery-like process would be overcome by the new "guided discretion" capital statutes like those conditionally approved in Gregg (1976:222):
As the types of murderers from which the death penalty may be imposed become more narrowly defined and are limited ... by reason of the aggravating circumstances requirement, it becomes reasonable to expect that juries-even given discretion not to impose the death penalty-will impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined.
If they do, it can no longer be said that the penalty is being imposed wantonly or freakishly.
A One-Urn Model of Charging
What would an "as if" lottery look like? Consider first a situation in which there is a pool of offenders arrested for homicide. Consider also a single urn with three red balls and seven white balls. For each offender in the pool, suppose the balls are thoroughly stirred and a single ball blindly picked. If the ball is red, the offender is charged by the prosecutor with a death-eligible homicide; that is, if convicted, the offender could face the death penalty. If the ball is white, the offender is not charged with a death-eligible homicide but with some lesser degree of homicide. The key idea is that each offender is subjected to exactly the same probability of a death-eligible charge, and in that sense, each offender can be considered "exchangeable."
Suppose, now, that in a particular state jurisdiction the proportion of people charged with a death-eligible homicide is 30%. Moreover, suppose that after a careful examination of the facts surrounding each case, no subsets of offenders can be found whose conditional probability of a death-eligible charge is systematically different from 30%. It might then be reasonable to conclude that the real-world charging system behaved as if well-mixed red and white balls were being pulled from a single urn. At least, this seems consistent with the Justices' formulations.
Three points need to be stressed. First, as the Furman decision illustrates, uncertainty is in the eye of the beholder. It is always theoretically possible that apparently random differences in the judicial treatment of death-eligible cases reflect some systematic treatment of those cases by some as yet unidentified variable. Therefore, the assurance that we are dealing with "as if" capricious sentencing outcomes depends upon the care with which one has previously identified systematic patterns in the data. Observers may differ, therefore, on whether sufficient detective work has been undertaken and on whether a convincing case has been made.' We will later confront these issues directly when our empirical example is discussed.
Second, self-interested offenders would be indifferent between such an "as if" lottery and the real-world charging system. The risks of an adverse outcome would be identical under both. Therefore, from the point of view of the self-interested offender, the two charging schemes would for all practical purposes be identical. Put another way, since the primary concern of a death-eligible capital defendant is whether or not a capital sentence is actually imposed, from the self-interested offender's point of view-viewed strictly from an outcome perspective-the real-world charging system is no different from a lottery.
Finally, should a particular jurisdiction produce a set of charging decisions consistent with a one-urn "as if" lottery, important constitutional issues would be raised. 
A Many-Ur Model of Charging
Consider a slightly more complicated process than our oneurn model. There are now several urns with red and white balls. The urns differ in the fraction of red balls and in the subpopulation of offenders whose fate they determine. For example, offenders who have committed especially heinous homicides and have especially serious prior records are assigned to an urn with nine red balls and one white ball. At the other extreme, offenders whose homicides are not highly aggravated and who are first offenders are assigned to an urn with one red ball and nine white balls. Offenders between the extremes are assigned through legitimate factors to urns with more balanced mixtures of red and white balls. Legitimate factors might include the existence of provocation, whether there was premeditation, and the weapons used. In short, each of several kinds of offenders is assigned to an urn with a given conditional probability of drawing a red ball and, therefore, a death-eligible charge.
Returning once again to the "real world," imagine that a data analysis of actual charging decisions produced estimates of conditional probabilities that were identical to those given by the urns. That is, each offender would seemingly face the same conditional probability under both systems: the hypothetical lottery and the charging system in practice. Moreover, imagine that careful scrutiny of the data unearthed no variables of any kind to distinguish those individuals within each urn charged with a death-eligible offense from those not charged with a death-eligible offense.3 Each collection of similarly situated offenders was subjected to the same (and only one) conditional probability; for each collection of offenders, a particular Bernoulli process apparently held (and not a mixture of Bernoulli processes). Therefore, within each collection of similarly situated offenders one has, once again, an "as if" lottery.
It is impossible to know what the Supreme Court Justices
would do with this analysis. The many-urn lottery is some distance from the clearly objectional single-urn lottery and yet admits a significant role for chance. Much depends on the implications of different conditional probabilities: how many urns and the shape of the distribution of conditional probabilities.
Using a simple example for illustrative purposes, a particular "as if" system might be acceptable if it were characterized by a large number of urns with most of the conditional probabilities concentrated near zero or one. Thus, if 90% of all death-eligible defendants included in the urn for highly aggravated homicides were charged with a capital offense, this might be constitutionally acceptable. Extrapolating somewhat from statements by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg (1976:203), "the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice." Implied is that there is really a set of "good guys" and a set of "bad guys" who are appropriately subjected to very different risks of deatheligible charging, and that, stated another way, most of the variability in charging can and should be attributed to which urn offenders were assigned.
In contrast, another "as if" system might be unacceptable if it were characterized by a very small number of urns with conditional probabilities all clustered around .50. Thus, if 50% of all convenience store robbers with similar prior records and characteristics were changed with a death-eligible offense for shooting a storekeeper in such robberies, this would not be consistent with an "isolated decision . . . to afford mercy" to one of every ten offenders, but instead is a virtual 50-50 coin flip. Implied is that meaningful distinctions between offenders were difficult to make and that most of the variability in charging could be attributed to the Bernoulli processes.
More challenging, and far more interesting, would be distributions that better mirrored real-world jurisdictions with, for example, several modes or large gaps, or long tails. In other words, beyond summary statistics such as the mean and variance, the Justices would have to consider theform of the conditional probability distribution. Imagine that each charging decision is made deterministically based on a host of case-specific variables: the weapon used, provocation by the victim, the offender's prior crimes, the kinds and strength of forensic evidence, degree of premeditation, and so on. The decision would be deterministic in the sense that, were it possible for different prosecutors (or the same prosecutor) to review the same case over and over independently, the same outcome would result each time. This is, of course, the kind of individualized justice in charging (and sentencing) that the Supreme Court has applauded. The prosecutor takes into account a very large number of legitimate variables, many with values that are unique for the case at hand, and then makes an unambiguous decision; each case is evaluated thoroughly on its particular merits. There are no rules of thumb and no shortcut decision procedures.
However, the Court's ideal leads to serious conceptual and practical problems. Even if deterministic individual charging were universal, a prospective examination of the charging process would necessarily produce an "as if" lottery experience for the defendant, the defense attorney, and even the prosecutor. If each case is truly unique, past decisions cannot be used to predict with certainty how the new charging decision will come out. It is impossible to know in advance exactly which characteristics of the crime and the defendant will (and will not) be used in the charging decision and how the selected characteristics will be aggregated to arrive at an overall judgment. In short, it is impossible to predict with certainty the future from the past, since the defendant's particular "decision rule" has yet to be written.
A different set of complications surface in any retrospective attempt to account for a given charging decision. Presumably, a decision rule has been applied, but the task now is to reconstruct it so that a fully accurate "backcast" can be made. That is, an observer not knowing the actual charge could reproduce the charge retrospectively with perfect accuracy. However, if each case is really unique, the exact means by which the charging decision was made must be unique as well; for every thousand defendants, there are a thousand unique decision processes, all of which would have to be recorded so that a later reconstruction is possible. That reconstruction, in turn, would have to capture with complete accuracy the factors that were taken into account and how those factors were combined into an overall charging decision. The only observer who could conceivably have full access to this information would be the prosecutor directly responsible for each decision; much of the relevant information would have to be recalled from memory. All other observers-the defendant, the defense attorney, the sitting judge(s)-could not possibly know all the relevant factors and how they were used. The resulting uncertainty would necessarily create an "as if" lottery for these observers.
What about the prosecutor directly responsible for the cases in question? Perhaps the most important point is that there is no means by which any prosecutor's retrospective account of the charging decision could be fully evaluated; no one else could possibly have all the necessary information. To summarize, the many-urn model may be a reasonable description of charging decisions in homicide cases not just because of ignorance on the part of outside observers, and even prosecutors themselves, but also because all charging decisions cannot be deterministic in practice. We are suggesting, therefore, that prosecutorial decisions to charge suspects with a capital crime or to prefer "special circumstances" may be empirically indistinguishable from "as if" lotteries, as we conceptualized them. This implies that it should be possible to formulate statistical models of our "as if" lotteries using data on actual charging decisions that could be used to address capriciousness in particular jurisdictions. Moreover, such work could be used to underscore the question of which conditional probability distributions for charging may be acceptable to the courts. Indeed, it is the careful examination of the conditional probability distributions that we are especially advocating.
Four points should perhaps be stressed. First, even if a particular statistical model fits the data well, it does not mean that the model is correct in a causal sense; the actual mechanisms by which charging decisions are made may not be properly represented. It only means that offenders can be sorted into groups, each group with a single conditional probability of a capital charge. The residual heterogeneity, no doubt explained by a large number of omitted variables, produces in the aggregate a distinct binomial "experiment" for each cluster of offenders, each with a single probability of a death-eligible charge.
Second, these statistical requirements for a good fit are very demanding. While any empirical efforts are necessarily constrained by the amount of information in a given data set, evidence must be provided that a good fit has in fact been achieved. A simple assertion that all is well will not suffice. Third, other models, perhaps implying very different causal mechanisms, may also fit the data. Yet, a good fit between an "as if" lottery model and real charging decisions is all we need to make our case that an "as if" lottery is operating in a particular jurisdiction; we require only that systematic patterns in the data have been accounted for, that no models fit better, and that there is residual variation that will not go away.
Fourth, with the existence of an "as if" lottery empirically established, concrete considerations of the nature of the capriciousness require that the model's conditional expectations be carefully examined. This is where the important story lies. The enterprise we are proposing is a bit like forecasting. Good forecasts are often defined in terms of their predictive distribution and their relationships to the "true" (but initially unobserved) values to be predicted. Minimizing the sum of the squared forecasting errors is one illustration. There is nothing in this definition that speaks to the information used to make the forecast. The focus is on "output" not "input."
II. An Illustration The Data
To illustrate how various conceptions of arbitrariness might apply to a real-world setting, we turn to data on all homicides in the County of San Francisco from 1978 through 1988. The data were coded by staff in the Public Defender's Office from official records and forms filled out by police and prosecutors. Vehicular homicides were later excluded because, a priori, they are not death eligible under California law. In order to keep the analysis logically neat and avoid the selection biases that can result from sampling on the outcome variable, such cases were excluded solely on the basis of information that preceded the charging decision.
The outcome of interest is the decision by prosecutors to charge offenders with "special circumstances." In California, this means that the case is deemed to have certain aggravating characteristics specified by statute, which if affirmed either by plea or by trial would make the offender eligible for a death sentence. In short, if an offender is charged with special circumstances, the prosecutor is seeking the death penalty.
Of the 363 homicide cases in our data set, 7.4% (27 defendants) were charged with special circumstances. Clearly, prosecutors in San Francisco (and elsewhere) seek the death penalty in only a small fraction of homicide cases. This is both a finding of some interest and a potential problem for data analysts. With such a small fraction of offenders being charged with special circumstances, it is difficult to consider simultaneously the impact of more than a few explanatory variables.
Over 70 explanatory variables were available addressing such considerations as the number of victims, the relationship between the victim and the offender, the means of killing, possible motive, other crimes that may have been committed contemporaneously, the background of the offender and victim and so on. At the same time, however, past research (cited above) has shown that much of the story can be told with a modest number of explanatory variables. For example, Gross and Mauro (1989) build their fine book around analyses in which generally fewer than a half-dozen explanatory variables are used. We argue below that for our data, including more than a very modest number of variables does not demonstrably improve the fit.
The Statistical Analysis
One convenient way to translate our many-urn model into a means of analysis is to apply logistic regression, traditionally used in the analysis of death penalty sentencing. The explanatory variables in the logistic regression reveal, in effect, which urn was used for which offender, while the predicted probability for each offender would represent the fraction of balls in the urn that were red. Table 1 shows the explanatory variables on which we will concentrate. The first two variables represent illegitimate factors (race and gender), and the rest represent factors that speak to the seriousness of the crime or the prior record of the offender. With the exception of "Offender White," all of the variables were chosen before any mod-els were examined by drawing on the death penalty empirical literature, which suggests the factors most associated with sentencing outcomes in homicide cases. 4 Because several of the explanatory variables were quite skewed, we also estimated later some models with the explanatory variables recoded to reduce the leverage of certain observations (e.g., recoding all of the explanatory variables to dichotomous 0-1 variables). In addition, efforts were made to add variables to the model that past research had not considered (e.g., whether the victim was gay) or variables that were effectively alternative indicators of the same phenomenon (e.g., the total number of prior felony convictions rather than only the number of serious prior felony convictions). Perhaps most important, we were trying to find alternative, legally acceptable, and theoretically plausible explanations for apparent racial and gender effects. We found none, and the overall story did not change. In addition, we were, in an exploratory manner, trying to enrich the level of explanation. However, here too nothing important was altered. We will be more specific shortly.
The substantive story in Table 1 is extracted from the odds multipliers (which are statistically significant by likelihood ratio tests as well). Clearly, some of the effects are very large. For example, the odds of a death-eligible charge for white offenders are about five times larger than for nonwhite offenders, other things being equal. The odds for individuals who kill two people (about 3% of the sample) are nearly a hundred times larger than for people who kill only one person.
One way to explore the credibility of our results is to apply the diagnostic procedures developed by Landwehr et al. (1984) . In effect, one simulates what the residuals from the logistic regression would look like if the model were correct (a Bernoulli process with a single predicted probability for each configuration of explanatory variables) and then compares the simulated residuals with the actual residuals (see Appendix). Possible problems with the model are indicated by large disparities between the actual and simulated residuals (see below). When no such disparities are found, it increases one's confi-4 "Offender White" refers only to the suspect's race and, given the literature, perhaps requires a bit of discussion. Ideally, we would have preferred to consider simultaneously the impact of race of suspect, race of victim, and their interactions. However, there are four large racial groups in San Francisco (whites, blacks, Latinos/as, and Asians), well beyond what could be explored with our highly skewed outcome variable. At first, we examined charging effects attributable to the victim's race, in part because these are commonly found in the literature. Although there was some evidence of raceof-victim effects, particular racial effects were very difficult to isolate. We finally settled on the main effect of "Offender White," because it had perhaps the greatest impact among the racial variables. Recall, however, that if one is concerned with capriciousness, such matters are secondary. dence in the model, albeit without supplying definitive proof that the model is "correct" (Flack & Flores 1989) .
Consider Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 shows the diagnostic plot for the model reported in Table 1 The small cluster of potentially problematic points near the center of the graph reflect a few cases in which offenders were charged with special circumstances and where our predicted probability of that charge was very low. But by and large, the model does rather well. When "white offender" is replaced by an interaction variable, for white-suspect-and-white-victim, the results reported in Table 1 for the other explanatory variables were substantively identical and the fit to the simulated residuals virtually the same as in Figure 1 . That is, at least two models are consistent with our "as if" many-urn formulation. In contrast, Figure 2 shows the same simulation with the race and gender variables removed from the model. Clearly, far more points fall some distance from the straight line and outside the diagnostic envelope. Thus, one is able to discard some models.
While there is certainly no means to prove that our model is "right," its overall credibility was systematically explored in two other ways as well. First, a quantile-quantile display was constructed in which a set of X2 statistics for adding each potential additional variable was plotted against the quantiles from the X2 distribution. A close approximation of a straight line resulted. That is, the larger x2 values observed were well within what one would expect in a number of independent draws from a single x2 distribution.
Second, we constructed added variable plots. Figure 3 shows the effect on the fitted probabilities of adding in the variables Offender White and Victim Female (when no other race or gender variables are already included-i.e., the model in Table 1 without race and gender). The horizontal (x) axis is the estimated probability under a model that omits Offender White and Victim Female. The vertical (y) axis gives the change in the estimated probability after adding in these variables. Circles indicate offenders charged with special circumstances, points indicate offenders not charged. The change in probability is largely positive for the circles. That is, approximately 12 circles are substantially above the line at y =0, indicating better fits for 12 cases, 4 circles are substantially below the line, indicating worse fits for 4 of the death-eligible offenders, and not much change for 11 cases quite near the line. It appears, therefore, that race and gender, by and large, improve the goodness of fit in sensible ways. In contrast with perhaps one exception, none of the other variables in our data set seemed to be useful beyond what would be expected by chance alone. And that one variable made no substantial difference in the fit.5
5 That variable was whether the police report that the victim was "bound and gagged." However, a number of other variables also related to whether the crime was especially heinous, and none of these made an incremental difference in the model. Part of the problem was that the number of cases falling in these categories was very small. Another problem was the accuracy of the police accounts for events that might be difficult to verify, such as whether the victim pleaded for mercy. There are at least two ways in which these analyses may be construed. First, the model diagnostics may be taken at face value as goodness-of-fit indicators. As such, they provide some comfort but certainly do not require that our models are properly specified in a causal modeling sense. Second and far more important, the Landwehr et al. diagnostic is based on a simulation of the many-urn lottery described earlier. In other words, the computer algorithm described in the Appendix, produces the equivalent of a distinct Bernoulli process for each cluster of offenders identified by the logistic regression. This means that a computer simulation of a particular many-urn lottery is consistent with our statistical model of how a set of charging decisions was actually made. Put more strongly, the lottery mechanism represented by our logistic regression analysis of data from San Francisco is empirically indistinguishable from our computer-generated lottery mechanism. Arguably, therefore, we meet our "as if" requirement.
Finally, if our results are consistent with a particular manyurn lottery, what does the output of that lottery look like? Recall our earlier argument that it was through the distribution of outcomes that capriciousness might usefully be considered. Figure 4 shows a histogram of the fitted conditional probabilities of a capital charge, given our data and model. Clearly, for the vast majority of homicide offenders, the risks are very low, and few important distinctions are made between these offenders. For all practical purposes, these offenders are in all the same urn. But because the probability of a capital charge is nonzero, one offender is occasionally charged with a capital crime. From the point of view of that unlucky offender, the charging system must seem very capricious indeed! But since our concern is with the charging system, we must focus on the distribution as a whole. Figure 4 shows that there.is also a small group of offenders whose risks are spread across the moderate range and a very small group of offenders for whom the risks are extremely high. In other words, the distribution of conditional probabilities is highly skewed to the right.
What does Figure 4 convey about systemic capriciousness? We have argued that capriciousness in the criminal justice system is closely related to an inability to predict, either prospec-tively or retrospectively, a criminal justice outcome. An inability to predict, in turn, is nothing more than a difference between an outcome projected from existing information and the actual outcome. A conception of systemic capriciousness might then combine one or more measures of the gap between the projected and actual outcome (i.e., a deviation score) with one or more ways of aggregating those over offenders. Stated more formally, capriciousness would need to be addressed through loss functions.
For example, drawing from common measures of spread, it would be natural to consider some function of the squared deviations summed over offenders. However, we know of no jurisprudential justification for this approach. In addition to weighting an overall measure of capriciousness heavily in favor of the larger disparities, the sum of squared deviations assumes symmetry in the weighting. In particular, a "lightning strike" capital charge among offenders near the left tail of the distribution counts the same as a "lightning strike" reprieve from a capital charge among offenders near the right tail of the distribution. This would equate unforeseeable leniency with unforeseeable punitiveness. Our general point is that the selection of any summary measure of capriciousness requires further thought and that it is best, therefore, to begin with a consideration of the full distribution. What one then makes of that full distribution depends on how one weighs its different parts.
III. Discussion and Conclusions
If one were worried about omitted variables for the usual reasons, our formulations would nonetheless have more credibility than most that have examined death sentencing in the past. In addition to essentially replicating much past research, the diagnostics, model explorations and simulations we have employed provide some useful supporting evidence, heretofore unavailable, for the model. However, ours is not the only model that might survive the diagnostic analysis, and although race and gender appear to be important, there may be omitted variables with which they are highly correlated (and which have the same pattern of correlations with the other explanatory variables) that could reproduce the apparent effects. And these variables could conceivably be legally permissible.
Yet, here we are far more concerned with capriciousness than with the content of particular explanatory variables. The logistic regression diagnostics developed by Landwehr et al. (1974) allowed us to see how consistent our model of a particular set of charging decisions is with a many-urn lottery. It appears to us that the fit is quite good. This would seem to imply that death penalty charging decisions in San Francisco meet our "as if" lottery criterion. It does not matter that one other (at least) model might fit as well. What we are saying is that for many observers, including us, the charging process looks stochastic. We are also arguing that a self-interested offender would be indifferent between the "as if" lottery and the actual charging process because the charging outcome would be virtually identical. In that sense, both are equally real.
More important, we have shown that the "as if" lottery of charging decisions produces a highly skewed distribution of charging risks. Clearly, a large number of other distributions might have been produced: a bimodal distribution with cases clustered at the extremes, a unimodal distribution skewed to the right, a bell-shaped distribution centered at moderate levels of risk, a relatively flat distribution across the entire range of risk, and so on. Each of these distributions describe different patterns of the uncertainty for death-eligible charging. And if uncertainty is at the heart of jurisprudential concerns about capriciousness, these patterns may well contain very critical information; they provide information not just about the amount of uncertainty overall but how the risks are spread across different kinds of offenders.
For example, suppose that in another jurisdiction the "as if" charging lottery produces a bell-shaped distribution of conditional probabilities centered on a conditional probability of about .25. Suppose also that the range of this distribution fell between .00 and .50 and that its variance was approximately the same as the highly skewed distribution shown in Figure 4 . Which "as if" lottery is more capricious? Extrapolating from Justice White's apparent interest in being able to distinguish between the few at risk to a death sentence from the many not at risk, the highly skewed distribution is perhaps less capricious. However, any overall assessments of systemic capriciousness require a loss function. One could, in principle, construct a loss function that would make the highly skewed distribution more capricious.
The point is that any (and all) specifications consistent with a many-urn lottery would mean that current Supreme Court conceptions of lotteries, lightning strikes, or inexplicable sentencing patterns are at best incomplete. It seems to us that "as if" lotteries are virtually inevitable in death penalty charging (and all criminal justice processes more generally). "As if" lotteries are not a mere nuisance, which with proper procedure and vigilance can be effectively eliminated. Rather, they are an inherent and inevitable part of the whole. The critical job, therefore, is to figure out which sorts of "as if" lotteries are constitutionally acceptable and which sorts are not.
